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Dualism and Doctrine 
DOV FOX* & ALEX STEIN** 
What kinds of harm among those that tortfeasors inflict are worthy of 
compensation? Which forms of self-incriminating evidence are privileged against 
government compulsion? What sorts of facts constitute a criminal defendant’s 
intent? Existing doctrine pins the answer to all of these questions on whether the 
injury, facts, or evidence at stake are “mental” or “physical.” The assumption that 
operations of the mind are meaningfully distinct from those of the body animates 
fundamental rules in our law. 
A tort victim cannot recover for mental harm on its own because the law presumes 
that he is able to unfeel any suffering arising from his mind, in contrast to his bodily 
injuries over which he exercises no control. The Fifth Amendment forbids the 
government from forcing a suspect to reveal self-incriminating thoughts as a 
purportedly more egregious form of compulsion than is compelling no less 
incriminating evidence that comes from his body. Criminal law treats intentionality 
as a function of a defendant’s thoughts altogether separate from the bodily 
movements that they drive into action. 
This Article critically examines the entrenchment of mind-body dualism in the 
Supreme Court doctrines of harm, compulsion, and intentionality. It uses novel 
insights from neuroscience, psychology, and psychiatry to expose dualism as 
empirically flawed and conceptually bankrupt. We demonstrate how the fiction of 
dualism distorts the law and why the most plausible reasons for dualism’s 
persistence cannot save it. We introduce an integrationist model of human action 
and experience that spells out the conditions under which to uproot dualism’s 
pernicious influence within our legal system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he common law of torts does not permit recovery for negligently inflicted emotional 
distress unless the distress . . . accompanies a physical injury . . . [or is] suffered by a close 
relative who witnesses the physical injury of a negligence victim . . . .”1 
 
 
“The distinction which has emerged . . . is that the [self-incrimination] privilege is a bar 
against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which makes a 
suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.”2 
 
 
“Petitioner’s jury was told that ‘[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary 
consequences of his voluntary acts.’ . . . [W]e hold the instruction given in this case 
unconstitutional.”3 
The Supreme Court’s foundational decisions in Metro-North v. Buckley,4 
Schmerber v. California,5 and Sandstrom v. Montana6 seem to have nothing in 
common. Their holdings, made decades apart, span political eras and legal domains 
that could hardly be more different. 
Buckley held that federal workers are entitled to compensation for the bodily 
injuries they suffer but not for emotional distress on its own.7 Its reason for making 
stand-alone, emotional harms ineligible for recovery was not just that it is harder to 
tell whether certain claims of depression or anxiety are real. The Court explained that 
even reliably provable mental anguish does not qualify as the kind of harm for which 
tort victims can recover.8 
Schmerber is the Fifth Amendment case in which the Court limited the privilege 
against self-incrimination to “testimonial” but not “physical” evidence.9 Police and 
prosecutors cannot force a suspect or defendant to reveal his thoughts or memories, 
the Court held, but they can compel his blood and any other samples or markings 
from his body.10 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Metro-North Commuter R.R. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1997) (emphasis in 
original). 
 2. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). 
 3. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979) (alteration in original) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 4. 521 U.S. 424 (1997). 
 5. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
 6. 442 U.S. 510 (1979). 
 7. 521 U.S. at 432–37 (explaining that mental anguish is not actionable apart from bodily 
injury). 
 8. Id. at 430–31 (exempting only fear of imminent death for a worker who narrowly 
escaped an accident). 
 9. 384 U.S. at 763–66 (holding that the self-incrimination right covers thoughts and 
memories but not “compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or 
physical evidence’”). 
 10. Id. at 764–65. 
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Sandstrom made it unconstitutional for fact finders to be asked to assume that a 
defendant intends the ordinary consequences of his actions.11 Those consequences 
should simply be considered along with other evidence of criminal intent, the Court 
held.12 The expected outcomes of his actions, or bodily movements, cannot be 
presumed to manifest his state of mind.13 
The doctrinal divergence among these decisions conceals the philosophy that 
unites them. Schmerber, Sandstrom, and Buckley stand on the same analytic 
foundation, too important to go unnoticed and unexamined. Exposing this shared 
infrastructure helps to reconceive and resolve enduring puzzles within doctrines of 
harm, compulsion, and intentionality. 
All three of these decisions embrace mind-body dualism: the theory, credited to 
seventeenth-century philosopher Descartes, that the workings of the mind assume a 
form and significance distinct from the workings of the body.14 Buckley assumes that 
a victim of negligence is able, as a general matter, to exercise his mind to unfeel or 
unthink whatever feelings or thoughts cause him to suffer. Our tort law accordingly 
presumes that he can control his mental anguish, a power that he lacks over his bodily 
injuries. Schmerber, by denying the state the power to compel his thoughts or memories 
when it is free to force evidence from his body, prescribes that a defendant or suspect 
should retain special control over just the contents of his mind. Sandstrom, for its part, 
singles out a defendant’s mind as the manifestation of intent, knowledge, and other 
forms of criminal culpability that his bodily actions cannot in the same way fully reveal. 
The dualism that these Supreme Court decisions adopt has important implications 
for the doctrines of harm, compulsion, and intentionality. Buckley limits the kinds of 
suffering for which a tort victim can recover. Its underlying assumption that he can 
soothe his mental anguish makes stand-alone emotional harm unworthy of 
compensation. Schmerber expands state power to investigate crime by affording a 
right to silence against attempts to coerce only testimonial, or mental, forms of 
evidence; bodily samples are unprotected. Sandstrom refuses to identify intent from 
the foreseeable results of a criminal defendant’s actions. Instead, it requires that 
jurors derive the defendant’s culpability exclusively from his state of mind and use 
all available evidence to determine what that mental state was. 
What connects these landmark doctrines is that they all set the mind apart from 
the body. Buckley envisions the person as master of his mind, capable of willing 
away thoughts that cause him to suffer. Schmerber holds that a person’s mental 
processes occupy a personal sphere deserving of special protection against state 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. 442 U.S. at 522–24 (holding that any presumption that a criminal defendant intended 
to bring about the ordinary consequences of his actions violates his due process rights if it has 
“the effect of shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant . . . that he lacked the requisite 
mental state”). 
 12. Id. at 521–23. 
 13. Id. at 523–24 (holding it unconstitutional for jurors to determine the defendant’s intent 
by focusing only on his criminal act and not also on “additional facts not themselves 
establishing the element of intent”). 
 14. See JOHN COTTINGHAM, DESCARTES 119–34 (1986) (describing the Cartesian 
principle that human beings are composed of two elemental components—mind and body—
that are two wholly distinct substances). 
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intrusion. Sandstrom too presupposes the primacy of mind by locating criminal intent 
in a person’s thoughts rather than his deeds. 
This Article critically examines the prominence of mind-body dualism in our legal 
system. Surprisingly, we are the first to investigate this general phenomenon. Other 
scholars who have noticed dualism’s presence in our law have done so in passing 
and have limited their focus to specific laws and rules.15 None has conducted a 
comprehensive examination of dualism’s presence and impact on the common and 
constitutional law. We provide that systematic analysis for the first time here. We 
argue that the divorce of mind from body is a fiction that distorts the doctrines of 
harm, compulsion, and intentionality and that serves no redeeming value sufficient 
to justify its presence. This deconstruction gives rise to a constructive argument. We 
use insights from neuroscience, psychiatry, and psychology to develop an integrative 
model of mental and physical phenomena, and we apply this model to help resolve 
longstanding puzzles in our common and constitutional law jurisprudence. 
It should come as little surprise that mind-body dualism has lost much of its 
influence in philosophy and has been widely rejected within psychiatry, psychology, 
and neuroscience. If mind and body are separate, after all, it is hard to understand 
how the physical changes in neural chemistry that result from anxiety drugs or brain 
damage, for example, routinely change how we feel or what we think, or how the 
mental changes caused by placebos or trauma, for instance, alter the operations of 
our bodies.16 One need not discard belief in the soul or submit to crude empiricism 
to deny the picture of a shapeless mind that stands outside the body and controls it 
from another realm like a “Ghost in the Machine.”17 Mind and body are 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY: PHILOSOPHY OF 
ACTION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 120–22, 130–34 (1990) (criticizing dualism in criminal law); 
SUSAN EASTON, THE CASE FOR THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 207–35 (2d ed. 1998) (arguing that 
dualism cannot justify limits on the self-incrimination right); Adam Benforado, The Body of 
the Mind: Embodied Cognition, Law, and Justice, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1185, 1188 (2010) 
(“[O]ur laws and legal theories have not been immune to the power of the dualist 
conception.”); Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 183, 185–91 (2007) (recognizing dualist assumptions in copyright 
and patent law); Peter Halewood, Law’s Bodies: Disembodiment and the Structure of Liberal 
Property Rights, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1331, 1336–40, 1347–49 (1996) (analyzing dualism in 
property); Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 191 (1992) (criticizing 
dualism in torts); Francis X. Shen, Mind, Body, and the Criminal Law, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2036, 
2043–55 (2013) (identifying dualism in determinations of criminal harm); Laura Spitz, I 
Think, Therefore I Am; I Feel, Therefore I Am Taxed: Déscartes, Tort Reform, and the Civil 
Rights Tax Relief Act, 35 N.M. L. REV. 429, 433–37 (2005) (decrying dualism in the rules for 
calculating taxable income); G. Christopher Wright, Taxation of Personal Injury Awards: 
Addressing the Mind/Body Dualism That Plagues § 104(a)(2) of the Tax Code, 60 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 211, 233–36 (2010) (noting how changes in law and medicine make the mind-body 
distinction moot when calculating taxable personal injury awards). 
 16. See MARIO BUNGE, THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM: A PSYCHOBIOLOGICAL APPROACH 18 
(1980) (“Dualism cannot explain mental disease except as demonic possession or as escape of 
mind from body. If the body were an autonomous immaterial entity, then it should be immune 
to brain injury, drug action, and the like: it should be either healthy or sick from the start, or 
else susceptible only to the action of evil spirits.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 17. GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 15–24 (1949) (criticizing dualism for 
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interconnected, especially so for the complex states of being and doing like harm, 
compulsion, and intentionality that tend to carry the greatest significance in law.18 
Yet much of our doctrine, we show, treats mind and body as if they work and 
matter in critically different ways.19 It is tempting to suppose that there must be good 
reason for dualism’s pervasiveness in our laws—that the division between mind and 
body, even if it is not true, serves a useful pragmatic or expressive purpose. Our study 
suggests, however, that no such rationale can vindicate the prominent place of 
dualism in our legal tradition. We argue that dualism’s pernicious influence should 
be uprooted by devising policies and rules that cast off its distorting metaphysics. 
We develop and defend a new understanding of mind and body as conceptually and 
normatively intertwined. We apply this integrative model to reform the important 
doctrines of harm, compulsion, and intentionality. 
Specifically, with respect to the concept of harm in tort law, we argue that physical 
pain and mental anguish should be treated as the relevantly similar kinds of harm 
that they are. Both involve interactions between a person’s brain and the other parts 
of his body. Just as physical pain can and often does overlap with emotional anguish, 
anxiety, or depression, so too these mental distresses can make a person ache, tire, 
and withdraw.20 Buckley erred in singling out emotional harms as unworthy of 
compensation. The verifiable mental anguish that causes negligence victims to suffer 
should be actionable in tort law as a stand-alone harm. 
Our constitutional criminal procedure should likewise realign mind and body in 
the limits it places on the government’s power to compel self-incriminating evidence. 
Whether such evidence comes from a suspect’s body (e.g., blood sample) or his mind 
(e.g., confession) should not affect the scope of the state’s authority to force it from 
him. The physical as opposed to mental character of that evidence has no normative 
consequence in itself. What matters is that the government does not subject the 
suspect to procedures that violate his personal integrity or impose otherwise cruel or 
                                                                                                                 
 
presuming that acts of the body are caused by physical rules and processes wholly distinct 
from the autonomous, self-governing causes of mental acts); see also DANIEL C. DENNETT, 
CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED 35 (1991) (“Dualism’s embarrassment here is really simpler than 
the citation of presumed laws of physics suggests. It is the same incoherence that children 
notice—but tolerate happily in fantasy—in such fare as Casper the Friendly Ghost . . . . How 
can Casper both glide through walls and grab a falling towel? How can mind stuff both elude 
all physical measurement and control the body?” (emphasis omitted)). 
 18. This mind-body problem gives rise to a number of famous puzzles in the philosophy 
of mind. One is the “hard problem” of how to explain the way in which conscious sensations 
acquire attributes like colors and tastes. See generally David J. Chalmers, Facing Up to the 
Problem of Consciousness, 2 J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 200 (1995). Another is the “explanatory 
gap” between brain and mental states, between neural networks and sensations like pain. See 
generally Joseph Levine, Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap, 64 PAC. PHIL. Q. 
354 (1983). A third is how, if at all, we are able to make sense of the psychological experience 
of very different beings. See generally Thomas Nagel, What Is It Like To Be a Bat?, 83 PHIL. 
REV. 435 (1974). 
 19. See infra Parts II (harm), III (compulsion), IV (intentionality). 
 20. See generally, e.g., Gregg R. Henriques, The Harmful Dysfunction Analysis and the 
Differentiation Between Mental Disorder and Disease, 1 SCI. REV. MENTAL HEALTH PRAC. 
157 (2002) (distinguishing biological and nonbiological disorders of mind and body that 
impair a person’s mental and physiological functioning). 
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offensive consequences on him. This straightforward account disentangles 
Schmerber’s mindification of the Fifth Amendment. 
Dualism’s presence in the criminal law’s concept of intentionality is less 
straightforward. Here, we argue that a defendant’s intent and other legally significant 
states of mind should be determined by his actions and the normal consequences that 
follow from them. These actions, understood in the proper context, embody the way 
in which the defendant’s brain moved the rest of his body based on inputs from both 
his body and outside environment. What we tend to think of as evidence of mental 
states alone is in fact evidence of mind and body working together. So we argue, 
counter to Sandstrom, that a defendant’s intent is embedded in the action that his 
body carries out. He intends the natural result of that action unless it is forced from 
him through illness, duress, or accident.21 
A word on methodology is in order. We adopt a bottom-up approach that takes the 
legal doctrine as it is and tries to make the best sense of the theory that it reflects. The 
law is a social practice, and its public meaning—while of course contestable—has 
nevertheless developed in ways that accept certain conceptual ideals and normative 
values as more plausible than others, even decisively so. Our project seeks to hold up an 
animating commitment in clear view so we can examine the role it plays in our doctrine. 
Subjecting the inner life of the law to critical appraisal in this way makes it possible to 
determine whether or not its analytic and moral content is worthy of embrace or whether 
those immanent commitments require reconsideration and reform.22 
The Article unfolds in four Parts. Part I canvasses the philosophy and science of 
dualism. We emerge from this inquiry wielding an integrated account of the person 
as constituted by interlocking mental and physical phenomena. Parts II, III, and IV 
adopt this account to critique and rebuild the doctrines of harm, compulsion, and 
intentionality. We assess and reject the best reasons to abide dualism’s influence on 
our legal system. This Article concludes by bringing the doctrinal and normative 
implications of our integrationist account full circle. 
I. MIND OVER BODY 
What is the relationship between the human mind and human body? A widely 
accepted view regards them as different in fundamental ways.23 The bones, joints, 
cartilage, and ligaments that make up the body and its movements and other 
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. Whether he is guilty is a separate question because an intentional and facially criminal 
action may be justified or excused as a matter of law.  
 22. See Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of 
Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1494–99 (2001) (“viewing philosophical [legal] theorizing 
about knowledge as more than an a priori armchair exercise, but rather as continuous with and 
dependent upon empirical science”); Joshua Kleinfeld, A Theory of Criminal Victimization, 
65 STAN. L. REV. 1087, 1151–52 (2013) (tracing to Hegel a “social-theoretic approach” that 
“takes law as a form of embodied ethical life . . . [that] philosophy can help bring to light and 
expose to question”). 
 23. See Athena Demertzi, Charlene Liew, Didier Ledoux, Marie-Aurélie Bruno,  Michael 
Sharpe, Steven Laureys & Adam Zeman, Dualism Persists in the Science of Mind, 1157 
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 1, 8 (2009) (revealing the prevalence of dualistic attitudes that 
emphasize separateness of mind and body). 
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operations are distinct in form and in function from the thoughts, feelings, intuitions, 
and perceptions that make up the mind and its phenomena.24 The body has a tangible 
form whose functioning is subject to the laws of physics, whereas the mind is 
ethereal, its workings within our command.25 
Mind-body dualism captures a constellation of philosophically nuanced theories 
about the relation between mind and body.26 At the core ideal of all such dualisms is 
the conviction, commonly associated with René Descartes, that mental phenomena 
are meaningfully distinct from physical ones.27 Descartes argued that people are 
made up of distinct substances: the physical substance of the body that has mass and 
takes up space, and the mental substance of the mind that does not.28 These 
substances are so different, at least in this traditional Cartesian account of dualism, 
that they could even exist independently: the mind without the body (like a ghost) 
and the body without the mind (like a zombie).29 
Despite its popular appeal, substance dualism and its disconnect of mind from 
body has been roundly discredited.30 Take the case of Phineas Gage, the railroad 
worker who had an iron rod driven through his frontal lobe in an 1848 explosion.31 
An even-tempered man before the accident, he became intolerably stubborn, 
impulsive, and profane.32 The effects on his behavior were so dramatic that his 
friends declared that “Gage . . . was no longer Gage.”33 Contemporary science makes 
clear that a person’s mind and body interact together with his environment to produce 
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. William D. Hart, Dualism, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 265, 265 
(Samuel Guttenplan ed., 1994) (describing dualism as the view that body and mind are 
composed of profoundly separate substances). 
 25. Dualist thinking takes hold from an early age. Child psychologists argue that even 
babies perceive the world as divided into “physical things, which are governed by principles 
such as solidity and gravity, and immaterial minds, which are driven by emotions and goals.” 
PAUL BLOOM, DESCARTES’ BABY: HOW THE SCIENCE OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT EXPLAINS WHAT 
MAKES US HUMAN, at xiii (2004). 
 26. See Howard Robinson, Dualism, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2012), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012
/entries/dualism/ (distinguishing ontological dualisms—predicate, property, and substance—
from interactionist ones like epiphenomenalism and parallelism). 
 27. See generally René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, in 2 THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF DESCARTES 1 (John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff & Dugald 
Murdoch trans., 1984) (1641). 
 28. See id. at 53–54. 
 29. See generally Philip Goff, Ghosts and Sparse Properties: Why Physicalists Have 
More To Fear from Ghosts than Zombies, 81 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 119 (2010) 
(canvasing the philosophical puzzles that the theoretical possibility of bodiless ghosts and 
mindless zombies pose for mind-body dualism). 
 30. See, e.g., AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS V, at 309–10 (2013) (recognizing the impossibility of distinguishing in 
any principled way between mental and physical illness). 
 31. See generally JOHN FLEISCHMAN, PHINEAS GAGE: A GRUESOME BUT TRUE STORY 
ABOUT BRAIN SCIENCE (2002). 
 32. See id. at 38. 
 33. Id. at 2. 
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phenomena like personality and suffering.34 This is why subjects placed under a 
hypnotic trance and told that they were being touched with hot metal developed burn 
blisters, even though it was just a pencil.35 
The brain networks with the rest of the body through two principal regulatory 
circuits.36 One is the bloodstream that carries biochemical signals from the brain to 
every muscle, joint, and internal organ, and from all those other parts of the body to 
the brain.37 The other circuit is the nervous system that, through the sensory and 
motor peripheral nerves, also carries signals between the brain stem or the spinal 
cord and every other part of the body.38 This organism that the brain and other parts 
of the body form together, in turn, interacts with its surroundings in the outside 
environment.39 This interconnectedness of the mental and physical helps explain why 
most of the complex human phenomena that we care about in law and in life cannot 
be reduced to the mind or body alone.40 
Only the integration of a person’s mind, body, and environment can make sense 
of these intricate states of being and doing.41 Wittgenstein put it best: “[O]nly of a 
living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one 
say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious.”42 
Nor can the mind—the Cartesian soul—be reduced to the brain in a way that could 
vindicate the dualist philosophy.43 The workings of the brain are a necessary 
condition for thought, feeling, and knowledge, but not a sufficient one. Brain activity 
is of course required for these experiences. But it is the whole of the person who 
thinks, feels, and knows; it is not his neurochemistry alone.44 
                                                                                                                 
 
 34. See generally 122 PROGRESS IN BRAIN RESEARCH: THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS FOR MIND 
BODY INTERACTIONS (E.A. Mayer & C.B. Saper eds., 2000). 
 35. See ERNEST R. HILGARD, HYPNOTIC SUSCEPTIBILITY 382 (1965). 
 36. See ANTONIO DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN 
BRAIN 87 (Penguin Books 2005) (1994). 
 37. See id. at 87–89. 
 38. See id. 
 39. Id. at 88–90 (arguing that what we think of as mind is the formation of neural 
representations of stimuli in the brain that are manipulated through mental thought, physical 
behavior, and outside environment). 
 40. Such reductionism is what neuroscientist Max Bennett and philosopher Peter Hacker 
have called the “mereological fallacy.” M.R. BENNETT & P.M.S. HACKER, PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF NEUROSCIENCE 111 (2003). 
 41. See P.M.S. HACKER, HUMAN NATURE: THE CATEGORICAL FRAMEWORK 276–84, 
(2007) (criticizing dualism’s false mind-body distinction for supposing that the indissociable, 
spatio-temporal continuant that is a person can be meaningfully separated into separate mental 
or physical parts or characteristics). 
 42. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 281 (R. Rhees ed., G.E.M. 
Anscombe ed. & trans., 1953); see also ANTHONY J. KENNY, The Homunculus Fallacy, in THE 
LEGACY OF WITTGENSTEIN 125, 125 (1984).  
 43. See HACKER, supra note 41, at 233–56 (criticizing brain-body dualism and referring 
to it as the “crypto-Cartesian mind of cognitive neuroscience”); see also BENNETT & HACKER, 
supra note 40, at 231–35 (arguing that “current neuroscientific thought is covertly Cartesian” 
in that it “allocat[es] to the brain a multitude of the psychological functions that dualism 
allocated to the mind”). 
 44. MICHAEL S. PARDO & DENNIS PATTERSON, MINDS, BRAINS, AND LAW: THE 
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Yet much in the doctrines of harm, compulsion, and intentionality assume, we 
will argue, that operations of the mind are distinct in critical conceptual, functional, 
and normative respects from bodily ones. When courts must determine what kinds 
of facts constitute criminal intent, what kinds of harms merit tort recovery, and what 
kinds of evidence are privileged against government compulsion, the question they 
ask is whether the harms are physical or mental. The Justices who decided Buckley, 
Schmerber, and Sandstrom need not have been self-conscious dualists for those 
opinions to reflect the estrangement of mind from body.45 It is instead the public 
meaning of this core tenet of dualism that these doctrines represent. 
Some readers might still think that the mind-body divide endorsed by the Supreme 
Court is a façade. Behind that façade, they might say, are the values and policies that 
the Court sought to promote by adopting dualism’s words but not its metaphysics. 
This argument suggests two rationalizations for dualism’s influence on the rules that 
these decisions fix in common and constitutional law. One of these rationalizations 
is expressive; the other is pragmatic. Neither justifies the preservation of dualist 
reasoning in our legal system. 
First is the claim that dualism, however unsound as a matter of logic or empirics, 
serves an expressive function in the law by imparting cherished ideals on which the 
law relies.46 For example, privileging mental evidence under the Fifth Amendment 
might promote the conviction that our minds merit special privacy protection as 
compared to our bodies.47 Likewise, in torts, singling out physical harms for 
stand-alone recovery might shore up the belief that while our bodies are open to 
poking and prodding, our minds remain hidden from external observation.48 Treating 
just mental harms as within our control might also preserve our self-conceptions as 
resilient creatures capable of withstanding the effects of life’s trials and tribulations 
on our minds.49 And holding a person unaccountable for an otherwise criminal action 
                                                                                                                 
 
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 44–46 (2013) (“People (not brains) 
think, believe, know, intend, and make decisions. Moreover, the presence of neurological 
activity is not sufficient for the attribution of these concepts to persons; it is not the measure 
of thinking, knowing, intending, or deciding.” (emphasis in original)). 
 45. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 463 (1990) 
(rejecting dualism). 
 46. See Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of 
Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1195–97 (1979) (arguing that judicial decisions should 
value social perception more than empirical accuracy); Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 
GEO. L.J. 1435, 1478 (2007) (arguing that judges might “recognize that the law often serves 
an expressive function, and they cling to premises, either consciously or subconsciously, that 
will produce legal rules with positive expressive value”). 
 47. See Dov Fox, The Right to Silence as Protecting Mental Control, 42 AKRON L. REV. 
763, 796–97 (2009) (“[O]ur thoughts are what anchor each of us as . . . [having the] uninterrupted 
autobiographical narrative . . . we tend to think of as most important about who we are.”). 
 48. See Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of the Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 585, 622 
(2011) (noting the longstanding view that “[t]he presence of a physical manifestation of 
distress . . . can serve only as a rough proxy for the severity of the distress”). 
 49. See Gregory C. Keating, When Is Emotional Distress Harm?, in TORT LAW: 
CHALLENGING ORTHODOXY 273, 276, 298, 300 (Stephen G.A. Pitel, Jason W. Neyers & Erika 
Chamberlain eds., 2013) (“Emotional distress differs from physical harm in a fundamental and 
categorical way. Our emotional reactions are mediated by our minds. Emotional injury may 
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that he carried out without a guilty mind reinforces our identity as moral agents 
capable of making free choices from among available courses of action.50 
The best reason to sustain any such dualist belief would be that it facilitates 
decisions that are substantively correct.51 But our analysis reveals that the fiction of 
dualism warps the rights and duties to which the doctrines of harm, compulsion, and 
intentionality give rise. Dualism helps to explain why the torts system scorns victims 
who suffer even serious and demonstrable emotional distress,52 why  
self-incrimination doctrine underprotects suspects and defendants,53 and why 
criminal law neglects the performative dimension of human action.54 We will try to 
show that the costs of these distortions outweigh whatever offsetting value dualism 
promotes or whatever conflict it mediates.55 
The second rationalization is less principled than it is practical. It underscores the 
costs of correcting dualism’s place in our law. On this account, the law might draw 
distinctions between mind and body as an imperfect proxy that makes it easier for 
judges to resolve complex disputes or for citizens to understand confusing rules.56 
But even large gains in administrative efficiency cannot generally excuse the 
accumulation of substantive errors in the delivery of justice. A related justification is 
that expelling dualism from the doctrine would upset the settled expectations of those 
who count on the stability of law.57 Notwithstanding the importance of stare decisis,58 
our legal system’s reliance on dualism cannot be justified unless the costs of 
correction exceed the benefits of correcting it.59 
                                                                                                                 
 
thus be the product—not the negation—of our agency. Often, emotional reactions are much 
more subject than physical responses to our . . . wills and our control. We can teach ourselves 
to toughen up and not be so sensitive, and we can steel ourselves against even exceedingly 
unpleasant experiences.”). 
 50. See Saul Smilansky, Free Will: From Nature to Illusion, 101 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 
71, 88–94 (2001) (“[O]ur priority should be to live with the assumption of libertarian free will 
although there is no basis for this other than our very need to live with this assumption . . . .”). 
 51. See LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 103–04 (1967) (defending fictions as a way to 
arrive at correct results). 
 52. See infra Part II. 
 53. See infra Part III. 
 54. See infra Part IV. 
 55. See generally Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
413 (1999). 
 56. See generally David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
731 (1987). 
 57. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and 
Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001). 
 58. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896–98 (1983) (rejecting social science 
findings casting doubt on predictions of future dangerousness on account of stare decisis 
considerations), superseded by statute on other grounds, Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 102, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217, as recognized in Slack 
v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). 
 59. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012) (distinguishing “the justification for following the decision in a previous 
case” from “the justification for being cautious before one overturns an established precedent”). 
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We will argue that this showing cannot be made: the costs of our proposed reforms 
are more or less fixed.60 By contrast, the distortions that dualism will generate into 
the future, if we allow it to stay, are boundless. We believe that the benefits of our 
reforms outweigh their costs. We make this case against mind-body dualism in the 
three Parts that follow. We expose, examine, and evaluate its entrenchment in the 
doctrines of harm, compulsion, and intentionality. This analysis spells out dualism’s 
damage to our legal system as well as our proposal to replace its influence with our 
integrationist model of mind and body. 
II. HARM 
A railroad pipefitter was among the “snowmen of Grand Central,” so called 
because the end of each workday had them covered with white insulation dust.61 It 
was asbestos.62 He exhibited no physical signs of cancer, but the latency period 
associated with asbestos-related diseases often keeps those exposed from 
manifesting symptoms for several years.63 So the pipefitter gravely feared that his 
prolonged exposure would eventually cause a painful and fatal illness.64 And he sued 
the railroad company for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.65 The legal 
dispute reached the Supreme Court in Metro-North v. Buckley.66 
The Court held that anxiety or despair is not, by itself, the kind of harm for which 
federal employees are entitled to compensation.67 Unless their mental anguish is a 
byproduct of physical injury, employees cannot recover for exposure “to a substance 
that poses some future risk of disease and . . . causes emotional distress only because 
the worker learns that he may become ill after a substantial period of time.”68 The 
majority explained that limiting claims for the negligent infliction of emotional 
distress prevents a “flood” of “trivial” litigation and the threat of “unlimited and 
unpredictable liability.”69 The Court accordingly tried to justify the sharp line that it 
drew between physical and mental harms on the basis that it enables a “tort system 
that can distinguish between reliable and serious claims on the one hand, and 
unreliable and relatively trivial claims on the other.”70 
Buckley makes too much of the generalization that “claims for emotional injury 
. . . are far less susceptible to objective medical proof than are their physical 
                                                                                                                 
 
 60. Importantly, we do not propose to revolutionize our system of torts by converting all 
kinds of mental discomfort into actionable damages. Under our proposal, emotional harms 
will merit recovery only when they are both evidenced and substantial. See infra note 124 and 
accompanying text. 
 61. Metro-North Commuter R.R. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 446 (1997). 
 62. Id. at 427. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 427–48. 
 67. Id. at 447. 
 68. Id. at 432. 
 69. Id. at 433 (quoting Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 557 (1994)). 
 70. Id. at 444. 
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counterparts.”71 This generalization is also a product of misguided mind-body 
dualism. We argue in the pages ahead that it is a mistake to assume that the harms 
associated with a person’s mind cannot be reliably confirmed like bodily harms can. 
What we think of as emotional harms tend to manifest themselves externally in no 
less verifiable ways than do physical harms. Where a mental harm exhibits no 
external manifestations, it would not merit compensation under our approach. This 
is not, however, just because that particular harm is harder to prove. It is more so 
because its absence of external indications suggests that it is indeed trivial or 
transient. That a subset of such emotional harms are less serious does not justify 
making them all noncompensable on their own either for evidentiary reasons or 
across the board. 
Yet tort doctrine broadly limits compensation that tortfeasors like the railroad 
company have to pay for the emotional kinds of suffering that they accidentally 
inflict on others. The lesson that Buckley drives into our tort law is that emotional 
suffering, however grievous or demonstrable, does not, on its own, qualify for 
compensation, even where modest or difficult-to-prove physical injury would. The 
result is that the bodily injuries that victims suffer are for the most part actionable in 
tort, but stand-alone emotional suffering is not.72 This bodification of harm doctrine 
underlies the federal and most state systems of torts.73 We will explore the doctrine’s 
distinction between mental and physical harms through the lens of five mechanisms 
that tort law uses to limit recovery for accidental injuries. These mechanisms are 
harm, duty, negligence, proximate cause, and evidentiary verification. 
The first mechanism limits which harms are actionable: impairments and 
deprivations are in; hardships and lost opportunities are out.74 The second mechanism 
narrows the scope of an actor’s duty to avoid harming others: such duty attaches only 
when an actor exposes others to a risk of sustaining harm or promises a person, 
expressly or impliedly, to keep him out of harm’s way.75 The third mechanism caps 
the safeguards against negligence: to avoid liability for tort damages, the actor must 
take only those precautions that cost less than the expected harm given its probability 
and magnitude.76 The fourth mechanism—proximate cause—absolves unforeseeable 
harms: tortfeasors need to compensate victims only for those harms that fall within 
the reasonably anticipated scope of risk created by the tortfeasor’s negligence.77 The 
                                                                                                                 
 
 71. Id. at 434 (quoting Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 552). 
 72. See Keating, supra note 49, at 276 (“For the most part, tort law has taken harm to 
mean physical harm, and harm itself has been understood as impairment.”); id. at 298 
(“Canonically, harm in the law of torts meant ‘physical harm’, in contradistinction both to 
pure economic loss and pure emotional harm.”). 
 73. See Levit, supra note 15, at 146 (“Compensable injuries still are, in large part, tied to 
either physical impacts, physical manifestations of injury, or other proxies for emotional 
distress.”). 
 74. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 302, at 822–24, § 308, at 835–36 (2000) 
(attesting that courts are reluctant to allow recovery for stand-alone emotional distress). 
 75. See id. § 308, at 837 (underscoring contractual relationships and implicit undertakings 
as a basis for liability for stand-alone emotional harm). 
 76. Id. §§ 143–146, at 334–48 (articulating cost-benefit analysis underlying negligence 
decisions). 
 77. Id. §§ 180–181, at 443–47 (articulating scope-of-the-risk analysis under the proximate 
2015] DUALISM AND DOCTRINE 987 
 
fifth and most frequently overlooked mechanism to limit tort compensation—
evidentiary verification—compels the dismissal of certain claims of liability when 
the plaintiff fails to provide specified forms of proof to verify his claim.78 
These claim-screening mechanisms operate differently across various categories 
of cases. For example, in products liability and ultrahazardous activity cases that 
involve physical injury, our system puts to work two mechanisms out of five.79 For 
other suits in which the plaintiff seeks recovery for personal injury or proprietary 
damage, it uses three or four mechanisms.80 Sometimes, a mechanism is applied 
loosely; at other times, strictly.81 There is only one category of cases in which all five 
mechanisms function at full capacity to clear away unwanted tort actions. This is the 
category of cases like Buckley—but extending far beyond just federal torts—in 
which plaintiffs seek compensation for mental or emotional harm including fear, 
shock, anxiety, grief, and distress. 
That our tort law so exceptionally limits compensation for emotional harm in all 
of these five ways reaffirms the distortionary impact of mind-body dualism on this 
doctrine. We examine the operation of each mechanism in turn.82 
First consider harm. Cases alleging emotional harm set an exceptionally high 
threshold for actionable harm. Emotional harm may qualify for compensation under 
existing law only if it is serious, lasting, and the product of a distressing episode in 
which the plaintiff was directly involved.83 For example, a mother can recover 
compensation for the shock of witnessing her child die in a car crash.84 Indirect 
involvement and transient anguish do not likewise qualify.85 So a person in anguish 
                                                                                                                 
 
cause doctrine). 
 78. Id. § 308, at 837–38 (explaining the special evidentiary requirement for emotional 
distress claims). 
 79. Id. § 354, at 978–79 (plaintiff’s burden in an action for harm caused by a defective 
product includes neither proof of manufacturer’s duty and negligence nor special evidentiary 
requirements); id. § 347, at 952–54 (noting the same burden for a plaintiff’s harm caused by a 
defendant’s ultrahazardous activity). 
 80. For example, in order to win a medical malpractice suit, the plaintiff must show 
actionable harm, negligence, proximate cause, and special evidentiary verification (a merit 
certificate followed by expert testimony). The duty to take adequate precautions against the 
patient’s harm is deemed to be present in all doctor-patient relationships. See Alex Stein, 
Toward a Theory of Medical Malpractice, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 1213–16 (2012). 
 81. This tradeoff is best illustrated by our laws of medical malpractice that contain heightened 
pleading and proof requirements with respect to physicians’ negligence alongside rules that make 
it easy for aggrieved plaintiffs to prove causation and damage. See id. at 1203, 1208. 
 82. These claim-screening mechanisms do not apply in actions involving intentional 
infliction of emotional distress by outrageous conduct. Our torts system seeks to depress 
outrageous behavior and therefore increases the wrongdoer’s prospect of paying for his misdeeds. 
 83. See DOBBS, supra note 74, § 309, at 839–40 (explaining zone-of-danger doctrine). 
 84. See, e.g., Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 526–28 (N.J. 1980) (allowing recovery under 
a similar set of facts). 
 85. See, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 830 (Cal. 1989) (in bank) (holding that 
because a plaintiff mother “was not present at the scene of the accident in which her son was 
injured” and so “did not observe defendant’s conduct . . . she could not, therefore, establish a 
right to recover for the emotional distress she suffered when she subsequently learned of the 
accident and observed its consequences”). 
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from having observed an airplane crash on a neighboring property suffers no 
actionable harm.86 He cannot recover, no matter how serious or clearly manifested 
his panic, shock, or distress. The harm mechanism limits mental as opposed to 
physical injuries accordingly, without regard to the seriousness of the victim’s 
suffering and the reliability with which those injuries can be detected. 
Next is duty. An actor’s duty to refrain from causing emotional distress to another 
has a similarly limited scope.87 This duty attaches only when the actor exposes 
another to a risk of sustaining imminent physical injury.88 In that case, the victim’s 
fear counts among the inventory of harms that the actor has a duty to avoid.89 This 
inventory also includes any anguish and distress associated with the victim’s physical 
injury.90 In exceptional cases, actors assume a duty to avoid emotional harm when 
they have a special relationship with the victim.91 An actor in such a relationship is 
presumed to instill reliance in the victim that he will take reasonable measures to 
protect him against emotional harm.92 Providers of medical care, from psychiatrists 
to fertility clinics, have this special kind of relationship with their patients that 
obligates them to care about their patients’ emotional well-being.93 
Proof of actionable emotional harm and the requisite duty to prevent it are 
necessary but not sufficient conditions for entitlement to compensation. The 
defendant must also have acted negligently. This third mechanism requires the victim 
to show that the defendant could have prevented his emotional harm by taking 
precautions that are reasonable in the sense that they are less expensive than the 
expected harm to the victim.94 The victim would easily make the required showing 
when his emotional harm results from physical injuries for which the defendant is 
responsible.95 In the case of such “parasitic” emotional harm, the extra effort to avert 
the victim’s emotional harm, on top of preventing his physical injury, is zero.96 By 
                                                                                                                 
 
 86. See Lawson v. Mgmt. Activities, Inc., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 756 (Ct. App. 1999). 
 87. See, e.g., Huggins v. Longs Drug Stores Cal., Inc., 862 P.2d 148, 151–54 (Cal. 1993) 
(in bank) (denying compensation for negligent infliction of emotional distress to parents of 
child who suffered drug overdose resulting from pharmacy error on the ground that the 
pharmacy owed parents no duty of care). 
 88. See DOBBS, supra note 74, § 309, at 839–40. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. § 377, at 1050–52. 
 91. Id. § 308, at 836. 
 92. See, e.g., Shin v. Sunriver Preparatory Sch., Inc., 111 P.3d 762, 770 (Or. Ct. App. 
2005) (holding that the special “relationship between an international homestay student and a 
school . . . gave rise to such a heightened duty on the part of the school to protect the student 
from emotional harm”). 
 93. See, e.g., Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., Inc., 534 A.2d 1282 (Me. 1987) 
(allowing claim for emotional distress after hospital negligently handed  plaintiff a human leg 
in a bag he believed contained his recently deceased father’s personal belongings); cf. Stein, 
supra note 80, at 1233 (noting that physicians often have a special duty to protect patients 
against emotional harm). 
 94. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (defining 
negligence as failure to take precautions that cost less than expected harm). 
 95. See DOBBS, supra note 74, § 302, at 822–23 (attesting that physically injured plaintiffs 
are always entitled to recover compensation for attendant, or “parasitic,” emotional harm). 
 96. See id. 
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avoiding the victim’s physical injury, the defendant would also have averted him 
from emotional harm.  
The victim will not fare nearly as well in an action for emotional harm as a 
stand-alone injury. There, the victim would have to show that his emotional harm 
was reasonably preventable.97 Return to the plane crash example. This time, assume 
that the witness falls into a full-blown depression. This victim, too, will be denied 
recovery because preventing such remote emotional harms is too onerous. Those 
harms may be serious but they are too rare to justify costly litigation, and they require 
airliners to add even more precautions to their efforts at avoiding crashes.98 
Oddly, the rationale for this outcome does not apply with equal force to physical 
injuries. Compare the negligence rule for remote emotional harms with the “eggshell 
rule” that entitles plaintiffs with rare physical conditions—as uncommon as the 
collateral victim in our plane crash example—to recover full compensation for 
post-injury disabilities. In a leading eggshell case, for example, the defendant’s 
negligent driving caused an accident victim, who at first exhibited just a bruised chest 
and fractured ankle, to die six days later from the aggravation of a latent and 
unforeseeable heart disease.99 The Iowa Supreme Court held that the defendant had 
to take the victim in his delicate physical state and pay full compensation for his 
wrongful death.100 
This eggshell rule is right to extend the torts system’s protection to the most 
vulnerable members of our society. Prospective tortfeasors should take precautions 
that correspond to the average amount of harm associated with their activities. This 
average harm should reflect all kinds of tort victims, from the most frail to the most 
resilient. To exclude frail victims from the average-harm calculation would unduly 
diminish the appropriate level of precautions that prospective tortfeasors should take. 
But if this is so for those whose bodies are frail (like the rare plaintiff with an 
underlying heart condition), prospective tortfeasors should also have to account for 
similarly rare emotional harms. There is, in fact, no principled distinction between 
physically and emotionally fragile harms. Instead, however, our negligence doctrine 
has two faces. One face shows compassion for those who suffer physical injuries; the 
other disparages those who suffer from emotional harms. 
The proximate-cause and verification mechanisms also screen claims of 
emotional but not physical harm.101 The proximate-cause mechanism adjusts the 
rules that determine the scope of the risk for which the tortfeasor will pay when his 
action materializes into harm. Under these rules, he pays nothing for the harms that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 97. See, e.g., Samaan v. St. Joseph Hosp., 670 F.3d 21, 38 (1st Cir. 2012) (denying 
recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress due to plaintiff’s failure to prove 
causation). 
 98. See, e.g., Lawson v. Mgmt. Activities, Inc., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 750–51 (Ct. App. 
1999) (“Air crashes are inevitably going to be very expensive disasters. . . . Extending liability 
to those who suffer the emotional distress of several moments of fear just before the crash will 
merely dilute the pool of recovery, as well as make air transportation harder to insure.”). 
 99. Benn v. Thomas, 512 N.W.2d 537 (Iowa 1994). 
 100. Id. at 539–40. 
 101. See Gregory C. Keating, Is Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress a Freestanding 
Tort?, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1169–71 (2009) (explaining proximate-cause doctrine 
as limiting recovery for stand-alone emotional harm). 
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fall outside that scope even when he inflicts them on the victim.102 Take the neighbor 
who allows a young boy who lives next door to play with his loaded rifle. The child’s 
mother suffers emotional distress when she finds her son playing with the gun. Her 
emotional harm is nonredressable because it falls outside the scope of risks that make 
the neighbor negligent, namely those associated with bodily injury from shooting 
accidents. Because the mother’s emotional distress does not originate from such an 
accident, the negligent neighbor goes scot-free.103 By narrowing the scope of risk in 
this way, the rule permits tortfeasors to discount emotional harms. 
The cramped scope of compensable risks has to do with more than the familiar 
fears of manipulation and malingering. The evidentiary verification mechanism 
singles out emotional harm as a cause of action that is prone to abuse and hence most 
suspect. Tort actions must generally be proved, like any other civil suit, by a 
preponderance of the evidence—that is, by any evidence that makes the plaintiff’s 
allegations more probable than not.104 Actions for emotional distress as a stand-alone 
harm are excluded from this general rule, however, and allowed to proceed to trial 
only when a plaintiff produces special verification evidence as required by law.105 
This verification requirement varies from one jurisdiction to the next. 
Jurisdictions that take a more traditional approach require the plaintiff to produce 
“impact” evidence showing that the defendant’s negligent action actually contacted 
his body.106 Other jurisdictions, which form the majority, require evidence that the 
plaintiff was in the “zone of physical danger.”107 This evidence must demonstrate 
that the defendant exposed the plaintiff to a serious and imminent risk of physical 
                                                                                                                 
 
 102. See DOBBS, supra note 74, §§ 180–181, at 443–47. 
 103. This example draws on RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL 
& EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. d, illus. 3 (2005)—an illustration featuring a hunter who hands 
his gun to a child. In that hypothetical case, the child drops the gun on her toe and breaks it, 
but the hunter still assumes no liability because the shooting risk that makes him negligent is 
unrelated to the child’s harm. Id. The child’s broken toe falls outside the scope of the tortious 
risk, id., as does the mother’s emotional distress in the example we give in the text. 
 104. See Payne v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 775 So. 2d 683, 685 (La. Ct. App. 2000) 
(“It is elementary tort law that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence each element of his cause of action.”). 
 105. See, e.g., Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 447–48 (Tex. 
2004) (requiring “evidence of additional egregious, but wholly non-sexual, conduct in this 
case involving public humiliation, verbal oppression, physical threats, invasion of privacy, 
abuse of power, and mistreatment of an employee known to have been rendered susceptible to 
emotional distress”); see also DOBBS, supra note 74, § 308, at 836–39 (noting that plaintiffs 
can generally recover compensation for emotional distress on its own only when the suit is 
verified by evidence of direct impact or other objective proof). 
 106. See DOBBS, supra note 74, § 308, at 837 (discussing impact requirement); see also Robb 
v. Pa. R.R., 210 A.2d 709, 710–15 (Del. 1965) (surveying existing impact requirements and 
substituting Delaware’s impact requirement by prevalent “area of physical danger” standard). 
 107. See DOBBS, supra note 74, § 309, at 839–40. This was the rule in Buckley that rendered 
nonactionable the “physical contact” of asbestos exposure “that poses some future risk of 
disease and which contact causes emotional distress only because the worker learns that he 
may become ill after a substantial period of time.” Metro-North Commuter R.R. v. Buckley, 
521 U.S. 424, 432 (1997). 
2015] DUALISM AND DOCTRINE 991 
 
injury that made the plaintiff fear for his life or limb.108 The remaining jurisdictions 
suffice with evidence (usually provided by experts like psychiatrists or 
psychologists) that shows the plaintiff’s physical manifestations of the alleged 
emotional harm.109 The verification requirement has just one exception that might be 
called “common knowledge.”110 When a plaintiff’s emotional harm is common 
knowledge, he is allowed to proceed to trial even when he adduces no special 
evidence to verify his suit.111 A classic example is the plaintiff who sustains 
emotional harm from witnessing his child killed or injured in an accident.112 
Why is our torts system so restrictive with regard to redress for emotional harm? 
To answer this question, we must consider emotional harm against the goals of the 
claim-screening mechanisms. These mechanisms operate in order to prevent 
excessive liability for accidental harm.113 Excessive liability is socially undesirable 
because it unfairly benefits plaintiffs at the defendants’ expense and chills productive 
activities that expose actors to suits.114 Emotional harm is thought to risk excessive 
liability for two reasons, one substantive and the other evidentiary. Arguably, a 
person can overcome emotional harm. He can use willpower to regain mental 
strength. Emotional harm is characteristically less debilitating, according to this 
argument, than the kind of physical illness, disability, and disfigurement that the 
person cannot undo. Unlike physical impairments, emotional harm is also more 
difficult to observe, and so it is more vulnerable to fabrication by the unscrupulous 
plaintiff.115 Thus, the torts system allows recovery of compensation for emotional 
harm only in exceptional and well-evidenced cases. This is what the five 
claim-screening mechanisms do. 
This policy in our torts system corresponds to its dualist thinking that treats mind 
and body as separate and distinct from each other. On this account, it is the body that 
defines a person’s physical and emotional well-being. The body’s exposure to the 
outside world makes the person especially vulnerable to physical forms of injury. 
His mind, by contrast, is unseen, insulated, and supreme. This doctrinal 
understanding, a prominent torts treatise makes clear, postulates that a normal and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 108. See DOBBS, supra note 74, § 309, at 839–40. 
 109. See id. § 308, at 837–38. 
 110. See John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 
MARQ. L. REV. 789, 816–19 (2007) (describing the operation of this exception in Hawaii, New 
Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin). 
 111. Cf., e.g., Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 526–28 (N.J. 1980) (awarding compensation 
for mental and emotional distress to mother who watched her seven-year-old son suffer and 
die while trapped in elevator). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic 
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 878–81 (1998) (identifying prevention of excessive liability 
as one of the goals of the legal system). 
 114. See id. at 879 (“[I]f damages exceed harm, firms might be led to take socially 
excessive precautions.”). 
 115. But see Kolber, supra note 48, at 611–12 (discussing neurotechnologically advanced 
ways to measure pain distress that attend to its sensory, affective, and evaluative elements); 
Adam J. Kolber, Will There Be a Neurolaw Revolution?, 89 IND. L.J. 807, 831–35 (2014) 
(predicting that improved brain imaging for pain may relieve legal limitations in tort law on 
recovery for stand-alone emotional harm). 
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healthy person has willpower sufficient to exercise control over whatever thoughts 
and emotions cause him to suffer.116 This distinctive willpower of the mind is eroded 
only by psychiatric disorders that impair the functioning of the person’s brain.117 
Otherwise, a person can undo his mental anguish.118 
But the interrelatedness of mind and body shows that humans are no better able 
to unthink bad thoughts, banish negative emotions, or self-establish peace of mind 
than they are to will their physical injuries healed.119 Serious feelings of sadness, 
frustration, or worthlessness can cause physical symptoms including fatigue, loss of 
energy, reduced sex drive, excessive sleeping or insomnia, extreme weight loss or 
gain, crying spells, angry outbursts, back pain, and headaches.120 Such experiences 
demonstrably impede the person’s ability to work, to maintain fulfilling 
relationships, and to enjoy life in general. In extreme circumstances, they also can 
develop into full-blown major depression with ideation or actualization of suicide.121 
A plaintiff cannot control these harms, nor do they divide in any conceptually 
coherent or defensible way between the physical and mental. 
The empirically correct view of emotional harm makes it indistinguishable from 
pain and suffering resulting from physical illnesses and injuries. As an experience of 
the body rather than the mind, emotional harm is qualitatively the same as physical 
illness or injury. Emotional harm is frequently as endurable and transient as physical 
injuries and illnesses. It differs from them only in terms of evidence. Emotional harm 
is generally unobservable from the outside, even by psychiatrists and 
psychologists.122 It is usually evidenced by the patient’s story, whereas physical 
illnesses and injuries are generally observable and often lie in plain view. Doctors 
can evaluate them even when their patient does not say a word. As we have 
explained, however, mental harms routinely have symptoms that are readily 
observable.123 Nor are many physical injuries any more salient. Think of lower back 
pain or carpal tunnel syndrome. That they may or may not correspond to obvious 
inflammations or anomalies makes the epistemic distinction between mental and 
physical harm suspect. 
As a normative matter, this evidentiary difference is the only factor that should 
affect the operation of our torts system. The system should stop its indiscriminate 
                                                                                                                 
 
 116. DOBBS, supra note 74, § 302, at 823 (“An injured person cannot heal a broken leg by 
acquiring a better attitude about it. But some persons cope with distress better than others; 
everyone suffers distress in some measure and most people learn to get over or at least to 
minimize distress over a period of time. Others nurse their distress and build it up. Even under 
a thin skull rule, the defendant probably should not be liable for the plaintiff’s maladaptive 
attitudes about distress.”). 
 117. See DENNETT, supra note 17, at 27–29, 107–13. 
 118. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 74. 
 119. Cf. Keating, supra note 49, at 281 (“Emotional tranquility must be recognised as an 
interest worthy of protection in its own right.”). 
 120. See AARON T. BECK & BRAD A. ALFORD, DEPRESSION: CAUSES AND TREATMENT 12–
38 (2d ed. 2009). 
 121. Id. at 57–63. 
 122. See generally Danya Glaser, Emotional Abuse and Neglect (Psychological 
Maltreatment): A Conceptual Framework, 26 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 697 (2002) (noting 
that psychiatrists and psychologists struggle to recognize emotional abuse and neglect). 
 123. See supra notes 20, 119–21 and accompanying text. 
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screening of suits for emotional harm. All it should do is require that each plaintiff 
provide verifiable proof of his mental condition. In this way, every plaintiff would 
have to provide evidence identifying observable manifestations of his emotional and 
mental condition. These manifestations should relate to major life activities such as 
intimate relationships, recreation, and employment. The plaintiff would have to 
prove changes in his functioning along these dimensions following the infliction of 
the emotional harm.124 Put simply, our torts system must adjust its burden-of-proof 
requirements with respect to emotional harm. 
III. COMPULSION 
The incoherent distinction between the physical and mental infiltrates 
constitutional criminal procedure. There, this distinction governs the circumstances 
under which the government can compel citizens to surrender self-incriminating 
evidence. Consider two suspects, Bill and Joe, who police arrest upon a showing of 
probable cause. Police ask to take Bill’s blood for DNA testing. Bill knows this 
evidence will out him as a criminal, so he denies permission to take his blood. In 
Joe’s case, police ask him his whereabouts when the crime was committed. Joe 
knows that telling the truth will incriminate him, so he refuses to talk. 
Under the current constitutional regime, if Bill refuses to give over the physical 
sample, prosecutors can use his refusal in court as evidence of his guilt.125 Joe does 
far better: prosecutors cannot use his refusal to reveal his thoughts or memories as 
evidence of guilt.126 The contents of his mind are privileged against compelled 
self-incrimination by the Fifth Amendment.127 This Part critically examines this 
mindification of our compulsion doctrine. 
The Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, as incorporated against the 
states, protects anyone who the government accuses of having committed a crime 
from being compelled “to be a witness against himself.”128 The Supreme Court has 
held that to be a “witness” under the Constitution means that a suspect or defendant 
                                                                                                                 
 
 124. The California Supreme Court moved in this direction back in 1968 when it delivered 
its landmark decision in Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 917–25 (Cal. 1968) (in bank). 
Unfortunately, the Court decided to move away from Dillon and realign California law with 
dualist thinking in Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 826 (Cal. 1989) (in bank). For a superb 
analysis of the Dillon decision, see generally Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently 
Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513 (1985). New Jersey appears 
to be the only jurisdiction that still takes the normatively correct approach to emotional harm. 
See, e.g., Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12, 13–17 (N.J. 1965) (emotional distress actionable 
when negligence creates potential for physical harm to distressed victim); Portee v. Jaffee, 417 
A.2d 521, 525 (N.J. 1980) (“Since Falzone, this Court’s decisions have shown no hostility to 
the imposition of liability for negligently caused mental or emotional distress even without an 
attendant risk of physical harm.”). 
 125. See People v. Farnam, 47 P.3d 988, 1022 (Cal. 2002) (holding that the defendant’s 
“refusal to provide blood and hair samples” could be admitted as evidence to prove his guilt). 
 126. See, e.g., Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976) (“[S]ilence will carry no penalty 
. . . .”). 
 127. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763–66 (1966). 
 128. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). 
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is forced to give police or prosecutors information that could help prove a criminal 
charge against oneself.129 
This privilege against compelled self-incrimination—known as the right to 
remain silent or the right to silence—applies narrowly to protect only certain forms 
of evidence against seizure or transmission. Specifically, the right to silence 
proscribes “compulsion to extort communications” just from a suspect’s mind, as the 
Court first held in the 1910 case of Holt v. United States,130 leaving open to 
compulsion all evidence obtained from a suspect’s body.131 
Holt presented the question whether the prosecution could adduce into evidence 
at trial testimony that the shirt allegedly worn by a murder suspect fit the defendant 
after police had forced him to try it on.132 The Court held that the testimony was 
admissible.133 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote for the majority that “the 
prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is 
. . . not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.”134 To suppose 
that the right to silence privileges, beyond just the accused’s “communications,” even 
observations to “compare his features with a photograph in proof,”135 he explained, 
would be a patently “extravagant extension of the Fifth Amendment.”136 Holt thus 
laid the groundwork for the dualist distinction that the Supreme Court would codify 
a half-century later in Schmerber v. California.137 
At issue in Schmerber was whether the use of an involuntary blood test to prove 
a drunk driving charge violated the defendant’s right to silence.138 The Court found 
no violation in the admission of the compelled blood test to establish the defendant’s 
guilt.139 Writing for a 5–4 majority, Justice Brennan cleaved the universe of criminal 
evidence into the mental kind that the Self-Incrimination Clause privileges and the 
physical kind that it does not.140 He wrote that “[t]he distinction which has emerged, 
often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling . . . 
‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of 
‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.”141 
The majority held that the state was allowed to take and test the suspect’s blood, 
and then use that analysis to prove that the suspect had been drinking, because the 
right to silence “protects an accused only from being compelled to . . . provide the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 129. See, e.g., United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35–36 (2000); Doe v. United States, 
487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 465–66 (1981); United States v. 
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5 (1973). 
 130. 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 252–53. 
 133. Id.  
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. at 253.  
 136. Id. at 252. 
 137. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
 138. See id. at 758–59. 
 139. See id. at 771–72. 
 140. See id. at 763–64. 
 141. Id. at 764. 
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State with evidence of a testimonial . . . nature . . . .”142 The physical character of the 
suspect’s blood “in no way implicated” those “testimonial capacities.”143 
The physical-testimonial divide that Schmerber affixed at the heart of 
self-incrimination doctrine tracks the dualism of mind and body by protecting 
exclusively mental and not physical processes. Justice Brennan explained for the 
Court that the privileged category of testimonial evidence comprises “an accused’s 
communications, whatever form they might take . . . .”144 Whether verbal statement, 
written confession, or silent nod or wave, such testimonial evidence is protected 
when it is used to reveal the suspect’s thoughts, feelings, or memories.145 The right 
to silence offers no protection for voice patterns, handwriting, or gestures when such 
evidence is used for identification purposes, rather than to disclose communicative 
content.146 Nor does that right protect other kinds of physical evidence that come 
from the suspect’s body, like “fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements,” or 
bodily samples like blood.147 Another drunk-driving case, Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 
makes plain the mind-body dualism that self-incrimination doctrine takes for granted 
when it protects testimonial but not physical evidence.148 In Muniz, police arrested the 
defendant for driving under the influence and began interrogating him before having 
informed him of his right to silence.149 When asked, “Do you know what the date was 
of your sixth birthday?” the defendant slurred, “No, I don’t.”150 He argued that this 
response was protected under the Fifth Amendment.151 A four-Justice plurality of the 
Supreme Court decided the question by dividing the defendant’s response into its 
testimonial and physical components, privileging the former and not the latter. 
Justice Brennan held for the plurality that the substantive content of the 
defendant’s “no” was privileged as testimonial but that his body’s representation of 
that reply was not.152 The defendant’s negative answer to the sixth-birthday question 
was covered by the right, the Court explained, because it required the testimonial use 
                                                                                                                 
 
 142. Id. at 761. 
 143. Id. at 765 (arguing that neither the blood test nor its results involved “even a shadow 
of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by the accused”). 
 144. Id. at 763–64. 
 145. See id. at 761 n.5. 
 146. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266–67 (1967) (concluding that any compelled 
voice and handwriting sample that is used solely to measure the physical properties of a 
suspect’s spoken or written word, and not for the testimonial or communicative content of 
what was to be said, “like the voice or body itself, is an identifying physical characteristic 
outside [the Fifth Amendment’s] protection”); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 219–24 
(1967) (holding that compelling a suspect to try on “strips of tape such as allegedly worn by the 
robber” is unprotected “compulsion of the accused to exhibit his physical characteristics, not 
compulsion to disclose any knowledge he might have[,]” and that compulsion to “utter words 
purportedly uttered by the robber” was not testimonial evidence either because the suspect’s 
voice was used only as “an identifying physical characteristic, not to speak his guilt”).  
 147. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764–65. 
 148. 496 U.S. 582 (1990). 
 149. Id. at 585–86. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See id. at 587. 
 152. Id. at 593–94. 
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of his mental state to “relate a factual assertion or disclose information.”153 But the 
Fifth Amendment did not protect the “slurred nature of his speech,” by contrast, 
because it implicated only the “physical inability to articulate words in a clear manner 
due to the lack of muscular coordination of his tongue and mouth . . . .”154 
Self-incriminating thoughts and other mental states cannot be compelled, the Court 
made clear; but no less incriminating physical states can.155 
The Muniz plurality, in its attempt to explain why only the defendant’s words but 
not his slurring were protected, betrayed the strained nature of the 
physical-testimonial dualism. Justice Brennan brushed under the carpet the 
irrefutable truth that the “impaired mental faculties” evidenced by the defendant’s 
muddled reply could “fairly be characterized as an aspect of his physiology . . . .”156 
The defendant’s hazy thinking and foggy memory were caused, just as his slurred 
speech was, by the established depressant influence of alcohol consumption on the 
central nervous system.157 Conversely, evidence like a tattoo, usually categorized by 
the Court as physical, can be readily recharacterized as testimonial, as the Second 
Circuit recently did.158 Forcing the defendant to communicate inarticulate speech that 
implicitly admits his drunk condition is no different from compelling a suspect to 
confess to a crime. Its false division of mind and body leaves the testimonial-physical 
distinction unable to do the normative work required of it.159 
                                                                                                                 
 
 153. Id. at 589 (quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988)). 
 154. Id. at 590 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 155. Id. at 589. 
 156. Id. at 593 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[H]ad the police [in Schmerber] instead 
asked the suspect directly whether his blood contained a high concentration of alcohol,” 
Justice Brennan insisted, “his affirmative response would have been testimonial even though 
it would have been used to draw the same inference concerning his physiology.” Id. Justice 
Brennan had indeed conceded in Schmerber that “[s]ome tests seemingly directed to obtain 
‘physical evidence[]’ . . . may actually be directed to eliciting responses which are essentially 
testimonial.” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). 
 157. See generally Henri Begleiter & Arthur Platz, The Effects of Alcohol on the Central 
Nervous System in Humans, in 2 THE BIOLOGY OF ALCOHOLISM 293 (Benjamin Kissin & Henri 
Begleiter eds., 1972). 
 158. In United States v. Greer, 631 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2011), police used the defendant’s 
tattoo of the name “Tangela” to connect him to a rental agreement under the same name for a 
car in which illegal ammunition had been found. Id. at 611. He appealed his conviction, 
arguing that the state’s use of the tattoo violated his right against self-incrimination. Id. at 611–
12. The Second Circuit held that the physical tattoo was nonetheless testimonial evidence 
because “[t]he government relied on the tattoo not as an ‘identifying physical characteristic’ 
but for the ‘content of what [was] written.’” Id. at 613 (alteration in original) (quoting Gilbert 
v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266–67 (1967)). 
 159. Susan Easton has also criticized self-incrimination doctrine for its dualist foundations. 
See EASTON, supra note 15. But our critique is different from hers. We emphasize the 
emotional and physical harm that invasion by the government inflicts on a suspect or 
defendant. See infra notes 165–67 and accompanying text. Easton, by contrast, draws a 
continuum based on the communicative character of evidence ranging from most testimonial 
and least physical to most physical and least testimonial. See EASTON, supra note 15, at 218 
(proposing to replace the physical-testimonial distinction with a continuum that extends from 
oral communication at one end to materials from a dead person at the other). Nita Farahany 
too has displaced the physical-testimonial distinction with a far more nuanced one. See Nita 
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Here is what the Supreme Court in Muniz identified as the normative justification 
for the Fifth Amendment privilege: it protects criminal suspects from being forced 
to make certain choices that would inflict psychological cruelty.160 “At its core,” 
Justice Brennan explained, “the privilege reflects our fierce ‘unwillingness to subject 
those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or 
contempt,’ that defined the operation of the Star Chamber, wherein suspects were 
forced to choose between revealing incriminating private thoughts and forsaking 
their oath by committing perjury.”161 Physical evidence, on the other hand, does not 
“involve situations in which suspects were asked to communicate any personal beliefs 
or knowledge of facts, and therefore the suspects were not forced to choose between 
truthfully or falsely revealing their thoughts.”162 With the testimonial sixth-birthday 
question, by contrast, the “inherently coercive environment created by the custodial 
interrogation” forced the defendant to lie or provide evidence of his own guilt.163 
Yet nothing in this “cruel trilemma” justification against subjecting suspects to 
agonizing choices suggests that the right to silence should protect only testimonial 
but not physical evidence. The speaking, writing, nodding, and pointing that have 
been held to be “testimonial” are by no means the only kind of evidence that subjects 
a criminal suspect to a psychologically painful decision. It torments a person no less 
when he must choose between allowing the government to inspect self-incriminating 
bodily markings or extract physical samples, on the one hand, and, on the other, face 
punishment for refusing to give police that permission. That physical evidence 
removes a further decision that testimonial evidence triggers about whether lying is 
a distinction without a difference. This compulsion-versus-punishment dilemma is 
no less cruel than the trilemma that simply adds another unattractive threat of penalty 
for lying. The two otherwise identical suspects in our example, Bill and Joe—one 
asked to relinquish his blood, the other his thoughts—will be equally anguished by 
the decision whether to incriminate themselves and risk conviction or worse.164 
                                                                                                                 
 
A. Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 STAN. L. REV. 351, 366–99 (2012) (distinguishing 
among self-incriminating evidence that arises from identifying traits; evidence that arises 
without conscious processing; evidence that arises from memorialized photographs, papers, 
and memories; and evidence that arises from responses whether uttered silently or aloud). 
Easton and Farahany reject the binary distinction in a way that mindifies the privilege by 
making the “mental” part of evidence what matters most. Our focus on harmful consequences 
avoids this difficulty. 
 160. See Muniz, 496 U.S. at 595–96. 
 161. Id. at 596 (citations omitted). 
 162. Id. at 597–98. 
 163. Id. at 599. 
 164. The testimonial-physical divide in self-incrimination doctrine cannot be explained as 
a prophylactic against torture. Contra Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956) 
(The privilege against self-incrimination “was aimed at a more far-reaching evil—a recurrence 
of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in their stark brutality.”). This explanation 
espouses the same mind-body dualism that we criticize and endorses the old fallacious idea of 
confessio est regina probationum (confession is the queen of proofs). See PETER BROOKS, 
TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW AND LITERATURE 9 (2000) (“Confession 
has for centuries been regarded as the ‘queen of proofs’ in the law: it is a statement from the 
lips of the person who should know best.”). The antitorture rationale is also underinclusive: 
privileging only testimonial forms of evidence leaves defendants vulnerable to torture for 
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Whether the state should be allowed to force suspects or defendants into such 
choices is a separate question and not an easy one. Its answer depends on a range of 
constitutional and normative commitments, such as the proper scope of individuals’ 
protections against abuses of power by police or prosecutors in enforcing the criminal 
law. Whatever the answer to this question, however, it must be the same for both 
testimonial and physical forms of evidence. Compelling a suspect’s 
self-incriminating words or gestures subjects him to no more painful a decision than 
the compulsion of his bodily samples or markings. 
If protecting suspects from the cruel trilemma is in fact what justifies the privilege 
in the way that the Court claims that it does, then that justification renders the 
testimonial-physical distinction altogether irrelevant. When the government has a 
sufficiently strong reason to force a person to relinquish evidence that could be used 
to prove his guilt, this reason should be enough to justify forcing out testimonial and 
physical evidence alike. Conversely, when the government ought to be denied the 
power to compel a person to reveal self-incriminating information or materials, that 
person should be able to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege equally in relation to 
both forms of evidence. 
Equally important are the consequences of a defendant’s refusal to give the 
government a bodily sample. That the sample is not protected by the 
self-incrimination privilege does not under extant law authorize the state to forcibly 
extract it from the defendant’s body (at least not unless such extraction also 
constitutes a reasonable search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment165). All the 
prosecution can do under such circumstances is ask the court to draw inferences of 
guilt from the defendant’s refusal to surrender the sample.166 These inferences are 
predicated on the defendant’s implicit communication that the sample contains 
self-incriminating information that he wants to hide from police and prosecutors. 
This communication receives no Fifth Amendment protection, yet it is as testimonial 
as a person’s express acknowledgment of guilt.167 
The doctrinal distinction between testimonial and physical evidence thus 
collapses like the dualist divide of mind and body that it presupposes.168 The 
                                                                                                                 
 
physical evidence. Nor can the right’s protection of only testimonial evidence be justified on 
the ground that it induces police to look for additional evidence, for federal and state law has 
long required that confessions be corroborated in order to obtain a conviction. See Alex Stein, 
Constitutional Evidence Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 65, 118–19 (2008). 
 165. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767–71 (1966). Professor Michael Pardo 
has defended the physical-testimonial dichotomy on the ground that physical evidence brings 
into play reliable experts and factfinder observations whereas testimonial evidence passes the 
epistemic buck to suspects and defendants. See generally Michael S. Pardo, Self-Incrimination 
and the Epistemology of Testimony, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1023 (2008). This rationalization is 
novel and insightful. Yet, it lacks consequentialist appeal. Using a person as an epistemic 
authority against his interest causes him no intrinsic harm. Having his person invaded by the 
government, by contrast, does, and this kind of harm applies across both types of evidence, 
physical and testimonial. 
 166. See People v. Farnam, 47 P.3d 988, 1022 (Cal. 2002). 
 167. See Fox, supra note 47, at 796 (arguing that a suspect’s thoughts do not “communicate 
information that his blood does not, nor [does] thinking require[] . . . communicative processes 
that bleeding does not”). 
 168. This distinction can still promote an evidentiary policy that aims at protecting 
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Supreme Court should abolish the testimonial-physical dichotomy in its future Fifth 
Amendment jurisprudence. This dichotomy provides too fragile a footing to sustain 
our constitutional protections against oppressive criminal procedures. And it will 
continue to distort the outcomes of particular cases so long as it perpetuates the 
fallacy that mental and physical phenomena should receive an unequal protection 
against the heavy hand of state power. 
IV. INTENTIONALITY 
Criminal purpose. Mens rea. A guilty mind. The doctrine of subjective culpability first 
appeared in our criminal law in the nineteenth century.169 By the middle of the twentieth 
century, the defendant’s “guilty mind” was no longer questioned as a condition required 
to convict him of any serious crime.170 Courts came to regard it “a sacred principle of 
criminal jurisprudence that the intention to commit the crime is the essence of the crime.”171 
                                                                                                                 
 
innocent defendants against erroneous convictions. Abolition of the right to silence would 
motivate guilty defendants to lie about their innocence and pool with innocent defendants. 
Fact finders would then disbelieve all defendants who claim to be innocent but lack airtight 
evidence to corroborate their claims, and would consequently convict more innocent 
defendants than under the current regime. Defendants requested by government to provide 
bodily samples or other physical evidence have no lying option. From a strictly evidentiary 
standpoint, their refusal to surrender physical evidence should therefore trigger adverse 
inferences. See Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A 
Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 480 
(2000). But even from an evidentiary standpoint, the system does not require the 
physical-testimonial distinction. All it needs to do to protect the innocent is make the beyond-
a-reasonable-doubt standard even more stringent than it currently is. See id. at 470–74. 
 169. See Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law Reform and the Persistence of Strict Liability, 62 
DUKE L.J. 285, 290–91 (2012) (attesting that “Anglo-American criminal law has long moved 
on from the most restrictive understanding of . . . the ‘unlawful act’ theory, attributed to Sir 
Edward Coke and according to which the voluntary commission of any criminal conduct made 
one criminally liable for any resulting harm,” noting that the Model Penal Code posits “that 
criminal liability requires that an actor be culpable—meaning he has intent, knowledge, or 
recklessness—as to each significant element of an offense[,]” and arguing that “the dominant 
view in contemporary courts regarding mens rea requirements lies between Coke’s view at 
one end of the spectrum and the MPC position at the other” (emphasis omitted)); see also 
George P. Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HARV. L. REV. 469, 472–73 (1976) 
(attesting that the nineteenth century criminal law was “a jumble of technical rules” that 
attached criminal liability “to all conduct conforming to a collective image of acting like a 
[criminal] and only to such conduct”). See generally Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of 
Mens Rea: III—The Rise and Fall of Strict Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L. REV. 337 (1989) 
(explaining that the ongoing shift from strict criminal liability and presumed guilt to a 
comprehensive mens rea requirement gained significant ground during the twentieth century). 
 170. This condition for conduct’s criminalization was codified in the MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 2.02 (1962), which many states have adopted in one form or another. See Darryl K. Brown, 
Federal Mens Rea Interpretation and the Limits of Culpability’s Relevance, 75 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 111 & n.10 (2012). 
 171. Duncan v. State, 26 Tenn. (7 Hum.) 148, 150 (1846); see also Stephen P. Garvey, 
Authority, Ignorance, and the Guilty Mind, 67 SMU L. REV. 545, 545–46 (2014) (“The act is 
not culpable unless the mind is guilty. Everyone knows that.”). 
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No guilty mind, no crime.172 
This has not always been so. The criminal law used to worry less about the state 
of mind that animated the defendant’s action than it did about what could be gleaned 
from that act itself.173 As George Fletcher famously showed in his influential treatise 
on Rethinking Criminal Law,174 the doctrine’s present emphasis on the defendant’s 
subjective mental state marks a radical departure from the objective culpability 
paradigm that dominated criminal law for centuries.175 
Under the old paradigm, a defendant was criminally liable when he performed an 
action that manifested, in the ordinary course of things, his purpose to harm a socially 
protected interest of life, limb, or property.176 Then, if his action actually harmed that 
interest, he became liable for the completed crime.177 If the interest emerged 
unscathed, he assumed liability for a preparatory crime such as attempt or 
conspiracy.178 Altogether absent was any inquiry into whether the actor had a guilty 
mind.179 Under this framework, courts determined the defendant’s culpability by 
focusing on the final episode of the crime and its objective meaning.180 This doctrine 
of objective culpability, as we call it, enjoyed a long and venerable standing in the 
criminal law.181 We will argue that clarity about the integration of mind and body 
demands this doctrine’s resurrection. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sandstrom v. Montana182 played an important 
role in this evolution. Sandstrom jettisoned objective-culpability doctrine for a 
totality-of-the-evidence approach to identifying the actor’s actual state of mind.183 
The case involved a young man who killed an elderly woman by hitting her head 
with a shovel and stabbing her.184 He was charged with deliberate homicide.185 
To obtain a deliberate-homicide conviction in Montana, the prosecution had to 
prove that the killing was purposeful.186 Montana criminal law had long included a 
presumption that “a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary 
                                                                                                                 
 
 172. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952) (“[C]ourts of various 
jurisdictions, and for the purposes of different offenses, have devised working formulae, if not 
scientific ones, for the instruction of juries around such terms as ‘felonious intent,’ ‘criminal intent,’ 
‘malice aforethought,’ ‘guilty knowledge,’ ‘fraudulent intent,’ ‘wilfulness,’ ‘scienter,’ to denote 
guilty knowledge, or ‘mens rea,’ to signify an evil purpose or mental culpability. By use or 
combination of these various tokens, they have sought to protect those who were not blameworthy 
in mind from conviction of infamous common-law crimes.” (emphasis added and omitted)). 
 173. See Brown, supra note 169; Fletcher, supra note 169. 
 174. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978). 
 175. Fletcher called this objective approach “manifest criminality.” See id. at 115–18. 
 176. See id. at 116. 
 177. See id. at 116–17. 
 178. See id. at 115–16. 
 179. See id. at 117–18. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See Brown, supra note 169. See generally Fletcher, supra note 169. 
 182. 442 U.S. 510 (1979). 
 183. Id. at 521–24. 
 184. State v. Sandstrom, 580 P.2d 106, 107 (Mont. 1978), rev’d, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 109. 
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act.”187 This presumption shifted to the defendant the burden of producing “some 
evidence that he did not intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts” 
rather than requiring him to “disprove that he acted ‘purposely’ or ‘knowingly.’”188 
The trial court instructed the jury of this presumption, and the jury returned a guilty 
verdict.189 The verdict was affirmed by the Montana Appellate Court.190 
The Supreme Court reversed.191 It held that Montana’s presumption of intent 
violated due process by giving jurors the impression that it shifted to the defendant 
the burden of disproving an element of the crime.192 The Court explained that this 
appearance of burden shifting violates the due process requirement that the 
prosecution prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.193 The 
defendant’s conviction could stand only if the jury understood the presumption as no 
more than a permissive inference, the Court explained, and found him guilty on the 
totality of the evidence.194 It ruled that the jurors’ assessment of the inculpatory 
evidence ought to have been unaffected by their regard for the presumption.195 
Under this totality-of-the-evidence approach, a person’s intent has a subjective 
status independent of whether his action manifests the intent as an objective matter. 
A person’s words and actions do not themselves constitute criminal intent, but they 
serve as evidence of it.196 “[I]ntent is an element of a criminal” offense that the 
Sandstrom Court held “cannot be taken from the trier of fact through reliance on a 
legal presumption of wrongful intent from . . . [the] ‘ordinary consequences’ of [a] 
defendant’s [voluntary] action.”197 The defendant’s intention to commit a crime 
cannot, on this account, simply be presumed from his having acted so as to bring 
about the criminally prohibited consequence in the normal course of events.198 This 
approach also assigns no special status to the final episode of the alleged crime. That 
episode only provides important information about the defendant’s intent that fact 
finders must weigh together with other evidence.199 
                                                                                                                 
 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 107. 
 191. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 527 (1979). 
 192. Id. at 516–19. 
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 194. See id. at 514–15, 525–27. 
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 196. See id. at 523. 
 197. Id. at 523 (quotation marks omitted, citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 
U.S. 422, 430 (1978)). 
 198. See id. at 524. 
 199. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 311–12, 319–24 (1985) (relying on Sandstrom 
to find a due process violation in a jury instruction stating that a “person of sound mind and 
discretion is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts but the 
presumption may be rebutted. A person will not be presumed to act with criminal intention 
but the trier of facts, that is, the Jury, may find criminal intention upon a consideration of the 
words, conduct, demeanor, motive and all other circumstances connected with the act for 
which the accused is prosecuted.”). 
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The doctrine of subjective culpability assumes that people’s intentions are not 
theoretical or imputed, but real.200 That we cannot see, hear, or touch such intentions 
makes them no less factually present in the world; they are just harder to ascertain. 
This epistemic weakness obliges fact finders to interpret the totality of the evidence. 
Fact finders must convict the defendant when this totality shows beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he possessed the requisite intent for the crime. Otherwise, they must 
acquit. By separating the defendant’s objective actions from his subjective intent, 
these rules reject the notion that an actor’s intent is embedded in his action. This 
rejection reinforces the dualist platform of subjective culpability and mindifies the 
doctrine of intentionality.201 Moreover, it conflates a person’s intent with related 
thinking activities that include desires, plans, and designs. 
We believe that the doctrinal separation between intentionality and action is 
conceptually flawed and prone to create distortions in courts’ criminal-liability 
decisions. We posit that criminal intent should be treated as fundamentally distinct 
from a person’s desires, plans, and designs. When a person aspires or primes to do 
something, these states of the mind do not qualify as his intent.202 Neither does 
believing that acting in a certain way would be good for him. Even when he decides 
to act and reflects on how to carry that action out, this is best described as planning 
rather than intending.203 
Intention should be taken to be a person’s self-command to carry out a certain 
action.204 From a normative standpoint, this is the only mental state for which the 
person should be held criminally culpable when state of mind triggers a proscribed 
                                                                                                                 
 
 200. Fletcher aptly noted this connection:  
[T]he fallacy of assuming that ‘something happens’ internally whenever one acts 
intentionally follows from assuming that because there is a word intention, it 
must name some particular thing. Thus legal theorists think of intention as a 
‘mental state’ or a ‘state of mind’ that is present whenever one acts intentionally. 
FLETCHER, supra note 174, at 451–52. 
 201. See id. at 118–19 (“This [subjective criminality] pattern of liability presupposes a 
notion of intending that treats intent as a dimension of experience totally distinct from external 
behavior. Intending is conceived as an event of consciousness, known to the person with the 
intent but not to others. Thus the relationship of intending to action is dualistic rather than 
monistic. The intent exists in the realm of the mind, the act in the realm of the body.”). Fletcher 
also criticizes the doctrine for subverting the interests that criminal law is supposed to promote. 
See id. For further criticism of this criminal law dualism, see Bruce Ledewitz, Mr. Carroll’s 
Mental State or What Is Meant by Intent, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 71, 74 (2001) (criticizing the 
adoption of mind-body dualism in criminal law for confusing the concept of criminal intent). 
 202. See G. E. M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION 1 (2d ed. 1963) (noting serious conceptual 
problems in conflating different intentions for the future with intentional actions); GEORGE M. 
WILSON, THE INTENTIONALITY OF HUMAN ACTION 222–30 (rev. and enlarged ed. 1989) 
(explaining that there can be no “intention” when the actor is not yet doing anything). 
 203. See ANSCOMBE, supra note 202; see also WILSON, supra note 202, at 229–30 (explaining 
intentions for the future as “propositional attitudes” different from intentions in action); id. at 
231–35 (explaining intentions in actions as part of the actions carried out by the person). 
 204. See ANSCOMBE, supra note 202, at 25, 41–42 (explaining that intention is present in 
the action’s execution); WILSON, supra note 202, at 120–21 (unfolding an account of 
“intentions in action” that occur contemporaneously with the actor’s actions and the 
consequences they bring about). 
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action. A person cannot be convicted for his desires, aspirations, or plans alone. For 
that simple reason, culpable operations of the brain are limited to those that make the 
person act in a prohibited way. Duff put it well in his Intention, Agency, and Criminal 
Liability: “[T]he intention is identical with, not something separate from, [the 
actor’s] observable action.”205 
To be clear, we do not believe that mental states can be read from conduct 
automatically. Our position is that conduct is generally the best available evidence 
of mental states. This is because, save for instances of accident or insanity, mental 
states are embedded in and realized by the conduct they drive. This account of 
intentionality finds support in works by Fletcher,206 Duff,207 Anscombe,208 Searle,209 
Wilson,210 and Yaffe.211 We argue that a person can realize states of mind through 
his actions. It is this realization of mental states in action that properly constitutes his 
intent, and this is how the law should define that concept.212 Sandstrom erred in 
missing the interconnected workings of mind and body by defining intentionality in 
terms of mental state alone. 
The law of subjective culpability fails to shake that doctrine’s dualist 
underpinnings.213 Its mindification of mens rea supposes that a person can factually 
intend a crime without doing anything to implement his intent. He would not under 
such circumstances be guilty of the crime, but he would still be perceived as having 
intended to commit it. That a person could intend what he does not yet do runs into 
a serious conceptual difficulty. By cleaving intention from action, 
subjective-culpability doctrine divorces its taxonomy of criminal liability from the 
empirical reality. The doctrine attempts to bridge this rift with an ingenious 
conceptual apparatus that requires the prosecution to establish the simultaneity of a 
criminal action and the actor’s intent.214 This requirement reunites mind and body in 
the legal domain while maintaining their separation as a factual matter. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 205. DUFF, supra note 15, at 130. 
 206. FLETCHER, supra note 174; see also supra notes 200–01. 
 207. DUFF, supra note 15. 
 208. ANSCOMBE, supra note 202. 
 209. JOHN R. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD: THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN 
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 210. WILSON, supra note 202. 
 211. Gideon Yaffe, Conditional Intent and Mens Rea, 10 LEGAL THEORY 273, 306 (2004) 
(“Conduct has evidential primacy in the assessment of mental state.”). 
 212. We thank Larry Alexander and the examples and arguments discussed in his recent 
article, Larry Alexander, The Ontology of Consent, 55 ANALYTIC PHIL. 102 (2014), for 
pressing us to clarify this pivotal point. 
 213. See FLETCHER, supra note 174, at 118–19. 
 214. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251–52 (1952) (“Crime, as a compound 
concept, generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an 
evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense individualism and took deep and early root in 
American soil.”); see also People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337, 1345 (Cal. 1975) (in bank) 
(holding that simultaneous act and intent are prerequisites for conviction). 
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Mind and body exist apart according to this view. To make the master a criminal, 
his mind must want what his body does. That this account comes close to a plausible 
relation between mind and body sometimes allows fact finders to correctly ascertain 
a defendant’s intent. But fact finders will not always get his intent right under this 
dualistically distorted view. Consider a classic casebook hypothetical featuring a 
criminal, Clyde, who learns that his accomplice, Bonnie, is planning to cut a deal 
with the government. As part of that deal, she will provide evidence that will help 
the government to convict Clyde and send him to prison. Clyde decides to kill 
Bonnie. Armed with a gun and bristled with anger, he drives to her house. Clyde 
drives fast and fails to see to a pedestrian crossing the street. He runs over and kills 
the pedestrian, who turns out to be Bonnie. Is Clyde guilty of murder? 
Under subjective-culpability doctrine, Clyde can be guilty only of vehicular 
homicide. With some stretch, he may also be found guilty of attempted murder. 
Clyde is not guilty of murder, however, because—so goes the argument—he did not 
intend to kill Bonnie when he carried out the particular action that killed her (the 
reckless driving). It stands to ask why exactly he did not have the requisite intent for 
murder given the subjectivist separation between intentionality and action. When 
Clyde ran over the pedestrian, he was preoccupied with the idea of killing Bonnie. 
Indeed, the reason that he did not pay enough attention to the road was precisely 
because his mind was filled with that murderous thought. To avoid finding Clyde 
guilty of murder, subjective-culpability doctrine must reason based on the conceptual 
disconnect between his intent to kill Bonnie (with the gun) and his action that actually 
brought about her killing (reckless driving). 
In other words, the presence of Clyde’s murderous thought at the same time he 
drove over Bonnie does not constitute his intention to kill her. Its presence at the 
crash was instead a mere coincidence that does not satisfy the subjective kind of 
intent that modern criminal doctrine requires to hold Clyde culpable for murdering 
Bonnie. To satisfy that requirement, the prosecution had to show that Clyde minded 
his specific act of killing Bonnie. It is true he was thinking of shooting her. But his 
homicidal act of reckless driving was itself absentminded. So despite his murderous 
thoughts, Clyde is not guilty of murder. 
This refinement prevents subjective-culpability doctrine from falling apart. But it 
also commits the doctrine to the factually implausible idea that a person is guilty only 
when his mind drives his criminal act. This idea is factually implausible because it 
cannot sustain the professed separation of intention and action. If a person’s mind 
and body are thus detached, how could his mind drive his action as a matter of 
empirical fact? This would require that a mental-physical connection enable his mind 
to infiltrate his body and make it act in the proscribed way. 
To incorporate this integrationist account of the mind-body relation, 
subjective-culpability doctrine must abandon its dualist foundations. To avoid this 
unraveling, the doctrine could require conviction for only the simultaneous, rather 
than integrated, presence of guilty mind and act. But that would send Clyde to jail 
for murdering Bonnie even though he killed her by accident. This proposed 
reformulation cannot save subjective-culpability doctrine from the dualism that 
plagues it.215 
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Nor can subjective-culpability doctrine dispose of dualism in a manner consistent 
with Supreme Court doctrine. If Clyde’s state of mind when he killed Bonnie did not 
itself drive any homicidal action, then intent is a misnomer. Subjective culpability 
would do better to fasten a person’s mental state to his accompanying action by 
distinguishing three operations of the mind: (1) willing and contemplating to kill a 
person, (2) making the body create an opportunity for the killing, and (3) driving the 
action that actually performs the homicide. These operations of the mind capture 
distinct episodes in the actor’s mental life: planning, preparing, and acting. The 
actor’s state of mind in the third episode is the only one that makes any difference in 
determining his criminal intent.216 
The incorporation of any early mental states into the determination of intent 
confuses the question. Clyde has planned and desired to kill Bonnie, but he did not 
intend to do so. When he drove to her house with gun in hand, his mindwork—as 
related to the actions he contemporaneously carried out—included his preparation to 
kill and the creation of an opportunity for that killing. But the accident on the road—
the final episode that resulted in Bonnie’s death—foiled Clyde’s murderous plan. So 
he did not commit murder. But the Supreme Court implicitly rejected this kind of 
reconceptualization when, in Sandstrom, it required that fact finders look beyond the 
natural consequences of a defendant’s actions to consider the totality of the 
evidence.217 Thus, subjective-culpability doctrine cannot easily align mind and body 
in determining intent. Focusing on the final criminal episode requires the doctrine to 
parse states of mind into “desires,” “plans,” and “intents” and to use the concept of 
intent only in conjunction with the intent-holder’s action. This reconceptualization 
requires fact finders to use the final criminal episode as principal evidence for 
determining whether an alleged perpetrator acted intentionally. Sandstrom’s 
totality-of-the-evidence approach moves fact finders away from using that final 
episode, however, as principal evidence of intent or its absence. Instead, Sandstrom 
forces fact finders to process every element of the evidence without any 
presuppositions and accord each the weight that it deserves.218 
This unstructured fact finding is susceptible to two types of error. First, fact finders 
might misconstrue the defendant’s early plans or desires as his intent. Second, they 
might misinterpret the defendant’s unplanned criminal action as unintentional. Both 
                                                                                                                 
 
which provides that a person is guilty of the intended crime when he “acts with intent to harm 
B but misses B unintentionally and proximately causes the same intended harm to fall instead 
upon C.” Peter Westen, The Significance of Transferred Intent, 7 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 321, 322 
(2013). The doctrine achieves this result by transferring the criminal’s state of mind from B to 
C or, alternatively, by construing it as an intent to harm any person. Id. at 330–35. Our 
integrationist account of intent does not require this or any other fiction. Under this account, 
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is prove that the criminal did not harm C by accident. 
 216. Cf. Yaffe, supra note 211, at 307 n.39 (“[I]n ascribing mental states to a person on the 
basis of his behavior, we minimize attributing changes of mind to the agent. That is, explanations 
that attribute consistent states of mind to the agent over time are to be preferred to explanations 
that attribute mental states to the agent at one time that are abandoned at another.”). 
 217. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 521–24 (1979). 
 218. Id. 
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errors will owe to the fact finders’ failure to give the final criminal episode the weight 
it deserves. This episode is not just another piece of information that fact finders must 
consider together with other evidence in trying to reconstruct the defendant’s state of 
mind. Rather, it embodies the requisite intent for the crime or lack thereof. 
The landmark due process decision of Martin v. Ohio illustrates both.219 There, a 
battered woman was charged with aggravated murder for killing her husband.220 He 
had repeatedly attacked her and she decided that when he tried to hit her again she 
would use a gun, whether to scare him off or shoot him in the event that the assault 
became severe.221 State and federal courts upheld her conviction by a jury that had 
been instructed to find her guilty unless her self-defense story was more probable 
than not.222 The courts mistook her envisioning the possibility of shooting her husband 
as evidence of her intent to kill him. Her intent turns instead on the mindwork that 
accompanied the shooting. This act may have been driven by her desire to kill her 
husband or, alternatively, to injure him to avert the anticipated assault. Or she may have 
pulled the trigger to frighten him away. That only the first of these possibilities 
supported criminal intent reveals reasonable doubt as to this element of the crime. So 
the defendant should have been acquitted. Her credible claim to self-defense negated 
her intention to kill her husband when she pulled the trigger.223 
A similar miscategorization of the facts can also lead to an erroneous acquittal. 
Consider a variation on the facts in Martin. Assume that the prosecution’s evidence 
only covers the shooting. As in the actual case, the edited facts are open to three 
plausible interpretations: (1) the defendant intended to kill her violent husband, 
(2) she intended to injure him to avoid an assault, or (3) she intended only to scare 
                                                                                                                 
 
 219. 480 U.S. 228 (1987). 
 220. Id. at 230–31. 
 221. See id. 
 222. See id.; see also Ohio v. Martin, 488 N.E.2d 166, 167–69 (Ohio 1986). Under an Ohio 
statute, self-defense could be established only by a preponderance of the evidence. Martin, 
480 U.S. at 230 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(A) (1982)). The defendant argued 
that the instruction violated her right to due process. Id. at 231. The Supreme Court upheld the 
Ohio statute because states are permitted to shift the burden of persuasion to a defendant in 
connection with any affirmative defense that does not overlap with an element of the crime. 
Id. at 233–34. Based on its prior precedent, the Court held that proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is constitutionally mandated only in relation to the essential elements of the crime. See 
id. at 235 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)). Under this precedent, 
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preponderance of the evidence or even by a higher standard. Id. at 236. (reaffirming Leland v. 
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), a decision that upheld the constitutionality of a statute that 
required defendants to prove the insanity defense beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 223. See id. at 235 (explaining that “the necessary mental state for aggravated murder under 
Ohio law is the specific purpose to take life pursuant to prior calculation and design” and that 
self-defense does not negate this specific intent). 
2015] DUALISM AND DOCTRINE 1007 
 
her husband off. Because fact finders have no evidence showing the defendant’s plan 
and preparation, they might reasonably decide that she killed her husband 
spontaneously—that is, without premeditation or malice aforethought. This decision 
would reduce the charges from murder to manslaughter.224 
Moreover, the defendant might be able to avoid even the manslaughter conviction 
by asserting mistake or self-defense. All of this might be decided in the case of a 
defendant who actually intended to kill her husband during an outburst of mutual 
violence. A battered woman’s attempt at resisting her victimization, anomalously, 
increases the probability of her murder conviction. This anomaly is a direct and 
inevitable consequence of the totality-of-the-evidence approach and the dualist 
metaphysics it presupposes.225 
The doctrine of objective culpability fares better.226 It captures empirical realties, 
realigns with common sense, and escapes flawed dualist premises. 
Objective-culpability doctrine conceives a person’s mind and body as an integrated 
ensemble of mutually interactive biochemical and neural-regulatory circuits. The 
experiences of the mind make the person act by giving commands to his body. These 
mental experiences are in turn affected by the endocrine, immune, autonomic neural, 
and other inputs that his brain receives from his body as well as the surrounding 
environment.227 The person’s intent to act in a particular way is thus embedded in the 
act itself.228 This act reveals the command from the person’s brain that made him act 
the way he did.229 So when a person’s action is criminal, the mental command that 
triggered that act is criminal as well.230 This command just is the intent that should 
determine the person’s criminal culpability and punishment. 
Incorporating this account of intent into objective-culpability doctrine avoids 
conceptual and factual anomalies. This critical insight makes it possible to see that the 
car accident caused by Clyde’s reckless driving, for example, manifests not his intent to 
kill Bonnie but his desire to rush over to carry out his murderous plan. The indifference 
to the safety of other drivers and pedestrians that accompanied his desire to speed 
satisfies the offense of vehicular homicide. But it does not make Clyde a murderer.231 
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crimes. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Mediating Rules in Criminal Law, 93 VA. 
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Under objective-culpability doctrine, fact finders who confront a case like Martin 
v. Ohio would be instructed to focus in particular on the final shooting scene. 
Specifically, they would be asked to adjudicate among plausible interpretations of 
the defendant’s mental state in that scene. Because two of those interpretations would 
support the battered wife’s innocence, the fact finders would be instructed to acquit 
upon finding reasonable doubt as to whether she acted intentionally or with malice 
aforethought. The court should of course permit the defendant to adduce potentially 
exonerating evidence.232 But it should not allow the prosecutor to rely on the 
background evidence showing the defendant’s preparation for her husband’s assault 
as proof of murderous intent. Letting the prosecutor use the background evidence in 
this way would be prejudicial to the defendant because it seriously misleads the fact 
finders.233 Even if it was relevant, it never should have been sufficient on its own to 
demonstrate that element of the criminal offense. 
Objective culpability does more than evidence the actor’s crime: it constitutes that 
crime as a matter of substantive law.234 There are, however, important exceptions: A 
defendant who committed an objectively criminal act can still seek to exonerate 
himself by claiming that his action was an accident. The defendant would then have 
to produce evidence to substantiate this claim. If that evidence raises reasonable 
doubt as to whether the defendant acted intentionally, a factfinder would have to 
acquit.235 By the same token, the defendant would be exonerated if his objectively 
criminal act was engaged in as self-defense, out of necessity, or under duress.236 In 
exceptional cases in which mental disorder leaves a person unable to form intent, he 
should also be able to exonerate himself by providing appropriate evidence.237 
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Objective culpability presumes that a person intends the natural consequences of 
his actions.238 This presumption has strong empirical support: when people see 
something or do something, they generally understand what they see and mean what 
they do.239 For that simple reason, due process is not threatened by a doctrine that 
permits a rebuttable presumption of intent which shifts to the defendant the burden 
of raising reasonable doubt as to whether he acted intentionally. Sandstrom’s dualist 
lens warped its view of what intent really consists: the integrated workings of the 
mind and the body as one. 
CONCLUSION 
René Descartes famously declared that “except our own thoughts, there is nothing 
absolutely in our power . . . .”240 This claim presciently captures the intuitions about 
individual responsibility, well-being, and dignity that pervade our doctrine today. 
The dualist mantra that a person’s mind alone lies within his command generates 
troubling conclusions of law: that a person’s thoughts define how accountable he can 
be held for his actions, that a person can unfeel whatever emotions cause him to 
suffer, and that a person’s freedom to think what he wills is the crucial part of his 
self that deserves special constitutional safeguard. 
Correspondingly, the doctrine of criminal culpability requires that courts ascertain 
a defendant’s intent through his thoughts rather than deeds;241 tort doctrine holds that 
mental suffering is not worthy of compensation as a stand-alone harm;242 and the Fifth 
Amendment forbids the government from forcing suspects or defendants to reveal their 
thoughts, while allowing it to compel bodily samples and other physical evidence.243 
These doctrines of intentionality, harm, and compulsion proceed along the 
Cartesian assumption that our thoughts and feelings are separate and distinct from 
the operations of the body. Yet this widely held assumption reflects a deep 
delusion—conceptually flawed and empirically false—that distorts our laws in 
pernicious ways. 
Contemporary neuroscience, psychology, and psychiatry make plain that our 
mental and physical lives interact with each other (and our environment). A person 
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cannot be reduced to his mind or separated from his body. He is, inescapably, both 
at once. We have called on courts and legislatures to expel dualism from our doctrine 
in favor of this integrated vision of the ways in which people think and act. It is this 
vision that must guide the formation of our legal policies and rules. 
We have argued that the criminal law should determine intent based on those 
experiences of the mind that make a person act by giving commands for movement 
that are embedded in his body and the outside environment. Tort law should treat 
mind and body in kind by making mental anguish, like physical injury, actionable as 
a stand-alone harm. Finally, our constitutional criminal procedure should limit the 
government’s power to compel self-incriminating evidence based on what the 
compulsion does to the suspect or the defendant, and not on whether the evidence 
comes from his body or mind. 
Displacing dualism with mind-body integrationism has far-reaching implications 
for the American legal system. Only by recognizing the folly in thinking that we 
exercise control over our thoughts alone can we correct the callous and untenable 
privileging of mind over body, or of body over mind in the doctrines of harm, 
compulsion, and intentionality. 
